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Abstract: To determine the capabilities and limitations of human operators and automation in separation 
assurance roles, the second of three Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) part-task studies investigated air traffic 
controllers’ ability to detect and resolve conflicts under varying task sets, traffic densities, and run 
lengths.  Operations remained within a single sector, staffed by a single controller, and explored, among 
other things, the controller’s responsibility for conflict resolution with or without their involvement in the 
conflict detection task.  Furthermore, these conditions were examined across two different traffic 
densities; 1x (current-day traffic) and a 20% increase above current-day traffic levels (1.2x).  
Analyses herein offer an examination of the conflict resolution strategies employed by controllers.  In 
particular, data in the form of elapsed time between conflict detection and conflict resolution are used to 
assess if, and how, the controllers’ involvement in the conflict detection task affected the way in which 
they resolved traffic conflicts. 
Keywords: Human factors, air traffic control, human-in-the-loop simulation, function allocation, human-
automation interaction. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The transition to NextGen will likely include increasing 
levels of automation to help controllers perform their duties.  
A progression towards higher levels of automation could 
enable the controllers’ working environment to move from 
tactical separation management to strategic decision-making.  
Such automation is envisioned to expand performance 
beyond today’s limits by off-loading workload from 
controllers onto automated functions for the majority of 
routine operations (JPDO, 2010). However, the nature of this 
human-automation team is not well understood.  It is still 
unknown exactly which tasks are best allocated to the human 
operator as opposed to the automation, and vice-versa.  In 
considering this system as a whole, careful and thorough 
investigation is needed to better understand, not only how 
each team member performs in such environments, but also 
any associated human-automation cooperation issues.  
1.1 Motivation 
The motivation behind these investigations is to address a 
well-known problem: current-day air traffic control 
techniques are very labor intensive, and are limited to the 
amount of information controllers can process and keep in 
their working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  Function 
allocation is but one approach to this problem, wherein 
automation can take responsibility for some tasks, 
theoretically easing the controller’s workload. 
The current series of studies fall under NASA’s revised 
function-allocation research plan, which calls for advancing 
our understanding of the related air-ground and human-
automation issues.  In particular, the Airspace Operations 
Laboratory (AOL) focused on the following question:  
“Which separation assurance functions can air traffic 
controllers effectively perform in future air traffic 
management systems?”  Understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of individual team members is an important 
aspect in determining how to distribute tasks between team 
members.  As a first step towards gaining such insights into 
human-automation teaming, our approach has been to 
conduct part-task HITL simulations that identify the 
capabilities and limitations of the controller in key separation 
assurance tasks.   
1.2 Function Allocation Research 
In May of 2015, the AOL at NASA’s Ames Research Center 
(see Prevôt, 2014) conducted the second in a series of studies 
that explored the capabilities and limitations of human 
operators with regard to the separation assurance element of 
air traffic control.  Specifically, the research sought to better 
understand how best to allocate functions between controllers 
and automation, using the conflict-related tasks as its main 
focus.  The general approach sought to tease apart a primary 
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task from related secondary tasks.  While looking across 
varying levels of automation, the studies measured the overall 
impact on the performance of the primary task.  Of particular 
interest to the second study was discovering whether 
removing controllers’ involvement in the detection task 
would impact their ability to resolve conflicts.   
The first study, referred to as the Human-Automation 
Conflict Detection study (or HACD), and the second study, 
referred to as the Human-Automation Conflict Resolution 
study (or HACR), are reported by Edwards (2016), Homola 
(2016), Mercer (2016a), and Mercer (2016b).  However, this 
paper also includes, in the following section, a brief 
description of the HACR simulation environment, 
establishing the appropriate context for the later discussions. 
2. METHOD 
HACR examined controller performance on the conflict 
resolution task under different run lengths, traffic density 
levels, and task sets, where the group of tasks under the 
controller’s responsibility (versus those under the 
automation’s responsibility) defined a given task set.  
Although the full study featured a 5x2x2 within-subject 
repeated-measures design, the scope of this paper and its 
analyses are limited to the following two of the study’s five 
task sets:  Conflict Resolution and Conflict Detection & 
Resolution.  This paper also examines the traffic density 
variable.  
2.1 Conflict Resolution Condition 
The Conflict Resolution condition’s aim was to fully isolate 
the conflict resolution task, and in doing so, removed the 
controller from the conflict detection task.  The study 
accomplished such isolation by developing a display 
capability that suppressed all air traffic from the radar display 
unless the automation (i.e., a trajectory-aided conflict probe) 
detected a potential conflict.  Once the automation detected a 
conflict, the system would turn off the ‘blackout’ mode, and 
display all traffic as it normally would, albeit with the aircraft 
in conflict highlighted (see Figure 1).  At this point, the 
automation’s task of detecting the conflict was complete, and 
it was then the controller’s responsibility to issue whatever 
control instructions they deemed appropriate.  When the 
automation no longer detected any conflicts, the blackout 
mode resumed, and remained in effect until the next conflict 
presentation. 
2.2 Conflict Detection & Resolution Condition 
The Conflict Detection & Resolution condition operated 
much like current-day air traffic control.  In addition to 
resolving conflicts, the controller was responsible for all 
conflict detection efforts, necessarily keeping constant watch 
over their sector’s radar display, observing the progress of air 
traffic in and around their sector, and issuing control 
instructions they deemed necessary.  
 
Fig. 1. Screen capture of the controller’s radar display in the 
Conflict Resolution condition before the automation detects a 
conflict (top), and after the automation detects a conflict 
(bottom). 
In order to get a clear measurement of when controllers 
detected a conflict, throughout the study they made keyboard 
entries to signal when they believed an aircraft pair to be in 
conflict.  Without this procedure, characterizing (i.e., 
quantifying) the conflict resolution process across the two 
conditions would have been difficult.  In the Conflict 
Resolution condition, measurements between an encounter’s 
‘start’ time (i.e., screen ‘on’ time) and the resolution time 
were clear.  A comparable measurement from the Conflict 
Detection & Resolution condition therefore, needed a similar 
encounter start time, ultimately satisfied by using the time of 
controller’s keyboard entry. 
2.3 Airspace and Traffic 
The airspace used during the simulation consisted of a single 
high-altitude sector, with a mix of overflights passing 
through at level altitudes, and transitioning aircraft 
descending to or climbing out from area airports.  The 
scenarios progressed through a ramp-up, peak, and ramp-
down phase, with each phase lasting approximately 20 
minutes.  Traffic levels reached 18 aircraft in the sector in the 
1x traffic density, and 22 aircraft in the 1.2x density.  The 
simulation environment also included winds for the area, 
which were constant-at-altitude with a nominal forecast error.   
2.4 Participants 
  
     
 
Eight retired FAA en route controllers (with an average of 
24.9 years of experience among them) participated in the 
study, all of whom worked the same conditions.  Four 
additional retired controllers staffing the airspace surrounding 
the test sector, as well as 12 pseudo pilots, worked as 
confederates in simulation. 
Each of the eight controller participants were assigned to a 
specific ‘world’ that was independent of the other ‘worlds,’ 
but run in parallel for data-collection efficiency. To 
accommodate the eight parallel worlds, four physically 
separate rooms each housed two test sectors.  To alleviate the 
chance of controllers being influenced by each other, the 
study design was such that the two controllers sharing a room 
never ran the same study condition at the same time.  This 
approach helped to limit the introduction of external variables 
and maintained potential cross-study comparisons between 
HACD and HACR, since HACD also used the same parallel-
worlds methodology.  
2.5 Equipment 
The primary simulation platform used for the study was the 
Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS), which, for each 
controller workstation, hosted an En Route Automation 
Modernization (ERAM) emulation on a large-format monitor 
(Prevôt, 2014).  The controller workstation also included a 
specialized keyboard and trackball, similar to those used in 
current air traffic control facilities, as well as a custom, stand-
alone voice application emulating the fielded communication 
system. Data recorded and collected at each workstation 
included aircraft flight states, operator task data and 
workload, automation states, and voice communications. 
2.6 Training and Data Collection Schedule 
The study took place over four continuous days within the 
same week.  After an initial briefing, the remainder of the 
first day served to train the controllers on the study 
environment and procedures.  The other days were devoted to 
the data collection effort, which produced a total of 20 runs to 
encompass the study’s design.  The controllers completed 
questionnaires at the end of each run, as well as a post-
simulation questionnaire.  Debrief discussions provided an 
additional opportunity for controllers to offer feedback. 
3. RESULTS 
The current analyses examine the impact of the conflict 
detection task on the manner in which controllers resolved 
traffic conflicts.  We theorize that it takes controllers more 
time to identify a resolution for a conflict when removed 
from the detection task, as opposed to when they are engaged 
in the detection task. 
3.1 Resolution Response Time 
The difference between the time at which the controllers 
issued a clearance to resolve a conflict, with the time of that 
conflict’s detection, yields the Resolution Response Time 
measurement.  In the Conflict Detection & Resolution 
(CD&R) condition, the detection time was marked when the 
controller made a keyboard entry to signal they believed an 
aircraft pair to be in conflict.  In the Conflict Resolution (CR) 
condition, the detection time was marked when the 
automation identified an aircraft pair to be in conflict (i.e., 
typically when the ‘blackout’ mode turned off). 
Histogram analyses arranging the resolution response times 
into 15-second bins revealed that, in general, the controllers 
were able to issue resolution maneuvers within 30 seconds of 
a conflict’s detection time for 49% of cases in the CR 
condition, but did so for 59% of cases in the CD&R condition 
(see Figure 2).   
 
Fig. 2. Histograms showing the distribution of resolution 
response times for the two task sets. 
 
After accounting for the traffic density variable, the same 
trend held true:  the proportion of resolution maneuvers 
issued within 30 seconds of conflict detection were 46% and 
56% for the same conditions (respectively) at the 1x traffic 
density, and 51% and 64% at the 1.2x density.   
A clear contributor to resolution response time is the context 
surrounding the conflict.  After identifying aircraft vertical 
state as a key element of a given conflict’s ‘nature’, a 
separate analysis categorized the resolution response time 
data according to the predicted vertical states of the aircraft in 
conflict.  Two categories emerged from this analysis: 
conflicts where the predicted loss of separation would 
involve both aircraft at a constant, level altitude, and conflicts 
where the predicted loss of separation would involve one or 
both aircraft in a transitioning altitude (i.e., climbing or 
descending).  Comparisons between the two conflict 
categories across each task set revealed maneuver proportions 
of 52% and 61% for the CR and CD&R conditions for level-
  
     
 
level conflicts, and proportions of 36% and 43% for the CR 
and CD&R conditions for non-level-level conflicts.    
4. DISCUSSION 
The resolution response time data provides a direct measure 
of how long it took the controller, from the time of a 
conflict’s detection, to issue a resolution.  In effect, this 
metric tells us the amount of time needed by the controller to 
figure out what to do, and when compared between the CR 
and CD&R task sets, helps to quantify the relationship 
between the conflict detection and conflict resolution tasks.   
Not only at the broadest level, but also for comparisons that 
separated the effects of traffic density or conflict category, 
controllers were more often able to ‘quickly’ determine and 
issue a resolution maneuver in the CD&R condition than in 
the CR condition.   These results suggest that involving the 
controller in the detection task helped them to instruct a 
resolution maneuver in less time.  The data most in support of 
this trend came from the task set comparison at the denser 
traffic level.  In fact, during the CD&R-1.2x condition, 
controllers had the highest concentration of resolution 
maneuvers issued within 30 seconds of conflict detection.  
Such evidence of a possibly clearer benefit in more complex 
situations suggests another interpretation:  that involving the 
controller in the detection task helped them to instruct a 
resolution maneuver with perhaps less effort.  This may be an 
indication of better situation awareness, since in the CR 
condition the controllers were primarily responding to 
highlighted conflicts, rather than actively scanning for them, 
as they were in the CD&R condition.  The importance of 
situation awareness developed via active engagement in the 
task is well established: “Situation awareness is essential for 
controlling; controllers must develop and maintain an 
accurate mental model of the dynamic traffic situation in 
order to plan and respond appropriately” (Endsley & 
Rodgers, 1994). 
In addition to comparisons between task sets, the findings of 
the conflict category analysis revealed a notable impact 
within each of the two task sets.  For conflicts consisting of 
one or more transitioning aircraft, a smaller proportion of the 
controllers’ clearances occurred within 30 seconds after the 
conflict’s detection, as compared to the same task set’s level-
level conflicts.  However, it is important to note that a 
majority of the traffic scenarios’ conflicts were in the level-
level category, and as such, one should use caution when 
interpreting these results, since this analysis examined sample 
sets of very different sizes.   
The resolution response time metric, as collected in HACR, 
does have its flaws.  The controllers’ responses to the 
questionnaires uncovered the first such consideration.  The 
controllers noted that the CR condition had more screen 
clutter than the CD&R condition.  In typical operations, 
controllers constantly adjust data block positions for 
legibility and organization.  In the CR condition’s blackout 
mode however, that data block management task cannot 
occur.  When the automation detected a conflict and 
disengaged the blackout mode, the controller may have seen 
a screen with overlapping and unorganized data blocks.  If 
such clutter disrupted the controller’s efforts to address a 
conflict, they may have needed to adjust some of the data 
block positions first, potentially adding to their resolution 
response time.  Another aspect relates to the initial conflict 
detection time used as the reference point for the calculation 
of the resolution response time data.  In the CR condition, 
automated logging made it clear when the blackout mode was 
disengaged as a result of a detected conflict.  By comparison, 
in the CD&R condition, controllers needed to make keyboard 
entries to signal they had detected a conflict.  Such entries are 
naturally subject to human error, and may include artifacts of 
the controller forgetting to make the entry immediately at the 
moment they detected a conflict, potentially lowering their 
resolution response time.  Also, the current-day coordination 
procedures between sectors can limit when controllers take 
certain actions, and were observed in HACR.  More 
specifically, controllers are not allowed to maneuver aircraft 
outside of their sector without prior coordination with, and 
permission from, the neighboring sector.  As such, the 
detected conflict between two aircraft on converging courses, 
that are both outside of the test sector at the time of detection, 
wasn’t always resolved right away; sometimes the controllers 
would wait until one or both aircraft were inside their sector 
before issuing a maneuver. 
These limitations in the data show why the study’s 
operational environment was not intended to represent an 
actual concept:  if such a system were to exist, it would need 
to address (or suffer from), each of those issues.  As further 
evidence of the need to look at this data in isolation, rather  
 
Fig. 3. Scatter plots showing the distribution of resolution 
response times as a function of time until predicted loss of 
separation (LOS), for the two task sets. 
  
     
 
than in the context of an operational concept, consider Figure 
3, which depicts the relationship between: 1) a conflict’s 
predicted time-until-LOS at time of detection, where 
‘detection’ was performed by the automation in the CR 
condition and by the controller in the CD&R condition, and 
2) the resolution response time. 
The scatter plots in Figure 3 show a possible shift in strategy 
dependent on whether controllers are, or are not, responsible 
for the conflict detection task.  In the CR condition, there is 
an obvious grouping of resolutions just after the automation 
displayed the conflict, with very few resolutions issued with 
less than 200 seconds until the predicted loss of separation, 
whereas in the CD&R condition, there is more of a natural 
distribution of detection and resolution response times, with 
many resolutions within 200 sec of the predicted loss of 
separation.  A review of screen recordings showed that 
controllers were working their resolutions into a larger plan; 
sometimes waiting to issue a clearance in order to facilitate a 
more effective series of resolutions down the road.  In 
contrast, the automated detection of the CR condition 
facilitated more of a “see and fix” situation, wherein the 
controller was likely to be less strategic in their maneuvers, 
possibly gaining just enough situation awareness to resolve 
the conflict safely.   
The apparent shift in strategy supports the substitution myth: 
a false belief that substituting the entity performing a task in 
order to, for example, compensate for known weaknesses, 
will preserve the basic system while improving its overall 
performance.  The truth however, is that such redistributions 
change how each entity effectively works within the system 
(Dekker & Woods, 2002).   
5.  CONCLUSION 
The results of these analyses offer evidence that, for human 
operators, involvement in the conflict detection task 
contributes to better resolution performance; when measuring 
performance in terms of resolution response time.  The 
consistency of these results across all of the between-task-set 
comparisons adds strength to this finding.  Mercer (2016b) 
will complement these analyses by exploring the relationship 
of resolution response time to the qualitative metrics of 
situation awareness and workload.  
These results came from an environment designed to measure 
the operator’s ability to resolve conflicts with and without a 
priori knowledge of the situation.  This study chose not to 
provide the controllers with tools to help them quickly 
augment their understanding of the situation (e.g., an 
interactive trial-planner capable of displaying real-time 
conflict-probe feedback), in order to avoid confounding the 
results with specific software implementations.  It is 
important to remember the part-task nature of this function 
allocation study: although the CR condition’s blackout mode 
offered unique and interesting environments, it was never 
meant as an operational concept, but rather a means to better 
examine the relationship between detecting conflicts and 
resolving them.  
Builders of future systems incorporating function allocation 
schemes - schemes in which controllers are still responsible 
for conflict resolution, must recognize that employing 
automation to ‘relieve’ the controller from the detection task 
is not without cost.  These results do not claim that such 
allocation schemes are bad or that such costs are 
insurmountable:  builders could point to benefits elsewhere in 
their system that outweigh such characteristics, and builders 
could provide helpful decision-support tools to the 
controllers.  These results do show that although certain tasks 
can be automated, whether or not they should requires careful 
consideration.   
The findings from this study are an initial step towards 
understanding the limitations of human operator performance 
in the air traffic control environment.  Despite the 
shortcomings related to the primary metric, these results 
confirm the need for more research that can identify 
dependencies between other component tasks, helping to 
inform the proper ‘placement’ of automation support for 
effective human-automation teamwork.   
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